Indirect Network Effects, Trade Liberalization, and Excess Standardization by Iwasa, Kazumichi & Kikuchi, Toru
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Indirect Network Effects, Trade
Liberalization, and Excess
Standardization
Kazumichi Iwasa and Toru Kikuchi
Kobe University
2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4399/
MPRA Paper No. 4399, posted 8. August 2007
Indirect Network Effects, Trade Liberalization,
and Excess Standardization
Kazumichi Iwasa and Toru Kikuchi∗
Kobe University
June 22, 2007
∗Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Rokkodai 2-1, Kobe 657-8501, Japan;
e-mail: kikuchi@econ.kobe-u.ac.jp; tel: 81-75-501-3801
1
Abstract
Indirect network effects exist when the utility of consumers is increas-
ing in the variety of complementary software products available for
use with an electronic hardware device. In this study, we examine
how trade liberalization affects production structure in the presence
of indirect network effects. For these purposes we construct a simple
two-country model of trade with two incompatible hardware technolo-
gies. It is shown that, given that both types of hardware exist before
trade liberalization, liberalization may reduce the variety of hardware
technology via intensified network effects. It is also shown that, con-
trary to the findings of previous studies, some consumers may become
worse off as the result of trade. In other words, trade liberalization,
which forms the basis for a greater variety of software products, may
work as a catalyst for excess hardware standardization.
JEL Classification: D43, F12
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of trade liberalization through both economic integration
(e.g., the European Union) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA)
has spawned a vast literature on the implications of trade liberalization.
As yet, however, little attention has been paid to the implications of trade
liberalization in the presence of products with indirect ( or virtual) network
effects.
Indirect network effects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing
in the variety of complementary products available for an electronic hard-
ware device. Examples of such devices include personal computers, video
casette recorders, and consumer electronics products. In systems that pair
hardware with software, an indirect network effect arises because increases in
the number of users of hardware increase the demand for compatible software
and hence the supply of software varieties. Since larger and more integrated
markets often provide greater product variation, these characteristics affect
the degree to which indirect network effects exist.
Despite the fact that many industries have indirect network effects that
are supported by trade liberalization, the literature on indirect network ef-
fects is almost exclusively focused on a closed economy.1 Because the role of
1 The seminal contributions on the role of a “hardware/software” system are Chou and
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indirect network effects is amplified in the globalized world,2 it seems impor-
tant to explore the impact of trade liberalization in the presence of products
with indirect network effects.
As our primary contribution, we examine how trade liberalization affects
production structure in the presence of indirect network effects. For these
purposes we construct a simple, two-country model of trade with two incom-
patible hardware technologies which is an extension of Church and Gandal’s
(1992) closed economy model. It is shown that, given that two incompatible
hardware devices exist before trade liberalization, trade liberalization may
reduce the variety of hardware devices. It is also shown that, if the variety
of hardware devices is reduced by trade liberalization, some consumers are
made worse off by trade. In other words, trade liberalization, which forms
the basis for a greater variety of software products (i.e., intensified indirect
Shy (1990, 1996), Church and Gandal (1992, 1996) and Desruelle et al. (1996). See
Economides (1996), Shy (2001) and Gandal (2002) for surveys of the relevant literature.
In the international context, Gandal and Shy (2001) analyze governments’ incentives to
recognize foreign standards when there are network effects. See, also, Kikuchi (2007) for
the analysis of trade liberalization in the presence of network effects.
2 Gandal and Shy (2001, p. 364) note that, in 1992, it was estimated that seventy-two
percent of all personal computers throughout the world were IBM-compatibles. That is,
they ran the MS-DOS operating system and were compatible with applications software
written for the MS-DOS operating system.
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network effects), may work as a catalyst for excess hardware standardization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes both
consumer preferences and technologies. Section 3 describes the basic model
and derives an autarky equilibrium. Section 4 considers the impact of trade
liberalization. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2 Consumer Preferences and Technology
Suppose that there are two countries, Home and Foreign, and that they are
identical in regard to tastes, size, and technology. In each country there are
three types of goods: hardware, a large variety of software products, and the
outside good. We assume that there are two hardware technologies in both
countries: Hardware 0 and Hardware 1. We also assume that the hardware
technologies are incompatible: software written for one hardware will not
work with the other’s. The characterization of the two hardware technologies
is exogenous: each is located at the end point of the unit line: let Hardware
0’s technology be at the left end point and Hardware 1’s technology at the
right end point. We denote the marginal cost of each hardware production
by c. We further assume that the hardware technologies are non-proprietary
and that they will be offered at marginal cost. In this and next sections, we
consider the Home autarky situation.
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Consumer preferences over the combination of hardware and software are
modelled as a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) CES utility function.3 We assume that
the distribution of the tastes of Home (Foreign) consumers is uniform along
a line of unit length t ∈ [0, 1]. We normalize the total number of consumers
in each country to 1.
The preferences of a consumer of type t for system h are:
U(t) = [
nh∑
i=1
(xhi )
θ]
(1/θ)
+ φ− k|t− h|, 1/2 < θ < 1, (1)
where nh is the number of software products written for Hardware h (h =
0, 1), xhi is the level of consumption of software product i written for Hardware
h, σ ≡ 1/(1 − θ) > 2 is the elasticity of substitution between every pair of
software products, and we assume that φ > k. k is a measure of the degree
of product differentiation between the hardware technologies: the greater k,
the greater the degree of differentiation
The representative consumer who purchases Hardware h will maximize
(1) subject to the following budget constraint:
nh∑
i
pix
h
i = e− c, (2)
where pi is the price of software variety i for Hardware h, e is the total
expenditure allocated to hardware and software, and c is the price (i.e., cost)
of a unit of Hardware h.
3 See, also, Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992).
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The solution to this problem consists of the following demand functions:
xhi = (e− c)P σ−1/pσi , (3)
where
P = [
nh∑
j=1
(pj)
1−σ]
1/(1−σ)
. (4)
The indirect utility of a type-t consumer who purchases a system h is
V (t) = nh
1/(σ−1)(e− c)/p+ φ− k|t− h|. (5)
The indirect utility function is concave in nh: the marginal benefit of another
software variety is decreasing.
Now, turn to the cost structure of software provision. The technology
for the production of software is characterized by increasing returns to scale,
since software creation typically involves fixed costs. We denote the constant
marginal cost of software production for every product by b, and the software
development cost by f .
We assume that software firms are monopolistic competitors, and thus,
each product is priced at a markup over marginal cost b:
p = bσ/(σ − 1). (6)
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3 The Model
In this section, we specify a simple game in which the strategy of each soft-
ware firm in a decision to provide software for either hardware, 0 or 1. The
timing of the game is as follows:4 In the first stage software firms enter the
industry. There is free entry into the software industry and software firms
have rational expectations. Although there may be more than one equilib-
rium software configuration, we show that the free-entry number of software
firms, N = n0 + n1, is unique, where nh is the number of firms providing
software for Hardware h. In the second stage, software firms simultaneously
choose which platform to provide software for. In the final stage, each con-
sumer purchases either a Hardware 0 or a Hardware 1 system and some of
the compatible software. We solve this problem backward.
3.1 Final Stage
Since we assume the marginal costs (prices) of hardware and software are
equal for both systems, consumers determine which hardware to purchase
considering only their tastes and the amount of software available for each
system. From (5), a consumer located at t purchases Hardware 0 if the
4 This is taken from Church and Gandal’s (1992) closed economy model.
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following inequality holds:
n
1/(σ−1)
0 (e− c)/p+ φ− kt > (N − n0)1/(σ−1)(e− c)/p+ φ− k(1− t), (7)
where use has been made of the equation n0 + n1 = N . Therefore, the
location of the marginal consumer who purchase Hardware 0 is given by a
function of n0, that is,
t(n0) = [n
1/(σ−1)
0 − (N − n0)1/(σ−1)](e− c)(σ − 1)/2kbσ + 1/2. (8)
And the first derivative of t(n0) is positive:
t′(n0) ≡ dt(n0)
dn0
=
[n
(2−σ)/(σ−1)
0 + (N − n0)(2−σ)/(σ−1)](e− c)
2kbσ
> 0. (9)
This means that the share of Hardware 0 is increasing in the amount of
software for it. It can also be shown that
t(0) ≥ 0 and t(N) ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ N1/(σ−1) ≤ kbσ/[(e− c)(σ − 1)] (10)
and
t′(N/2) ≥ 1/N ⇐⇒ N1/(σ−1) ≥ 21/(σ−1)kbσ/2(e− c). (11)
Based on the above, we can draw the function t(n0) as shown in Figure 1,
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where curves A, B, and C correspond to the graph of t(n0) under each of
5 The second derivative of t(n0) is negative (positive) if n0 is smaller (greater) than
N/2, since
d2t(n0)
dn20
= − [n
(3−2σ)/(σ−1)
0 − (N − n0)(3−2σ)/(σ−1)](σ − 2)(e− c)
2kbσ(σ − 1) ,
where σ > 2 from the assumption θ > 1/2.
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the following three cases: in case A, N1/(σ−1) ≤ kbσ/[(e− c)(σ − 1)]; in case
B, kbσ/[(e − c)(σ − 1)] < N1/(σ−1) < 21/(σ−1)kbσ/2(e − c); and in case C,
N1/(σ−1) ≥ 21/(σ−1)kbσ/2(e− c).6
Note that in cases B and C, t(n0) can reach 0 or 1, even if there are still
two types of software. Since the market is of unit length, that is, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
there exists a critical number of software firms for each type of hardware such
that if the number of software firms for one technology exceeds the critical
number, then all consumers purchase the dominant hardware. On the other
hand, in case A, there are two types of consumers unless one hardware is
standardized; no software for the other hardware exists.7
3.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, software firms simultaneously select the network for
which to supply software are. Given the marginal consumer, t, and the
number of competing software firms (n0 or n1), the profit of a software firm
writing software for Hardware 0 is
pi0(t, n0) = t(p− b)x0 − f = t(e− c)/n0σ − f, (12)
6 The importance of discrimination between case B and C will appear in the following.
7 Since we assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of software and pro-
vides no stand-alone benefits, in case A, the marginal consumer, t, changes discontinuously
to 0 or 1 when n0 is equal to 0 or N .
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and that for Hardware 1 is
pi1(t, n1) = (1− t)(p− b)x1 − f = (1− t)(e− c)/n1σ − f, (13)
where x1 = (e− c)/n1p. From these equations, it is easily derived that
pi0(t, n0)
>
<
pi1(t, n1) ⇐⇒ t >
<
n0
N
. (14)
Based on the latter inequality, each firm considers whether t(n0) is greater
than n0/N or not, and then chooses the network to supply.
3.3 First Stage
At any equilibrium where two networks coexist, pi0(t, n0) = pi
1(t, n1) must
be satisfied. Therefore, t = n0/N holds at the equilibrium and
pi0 = pi1 = (e− c)/Nσ − f. (15)
On the other hand, if all software firms provide software for one network at
equilibrium, then (t, n0) = (1, N) or (t, n1) = (0, N) hold and
pi0 = (e− c)/Nσ − f or pi1 = (e− c)/Nσ − f. (16)
Thus, the profit of each firm is independent of equilibrium software con-
figurations, and the free-entry number of firms, N , is uniquely given by
N = (e− c)/fσ from the zero-profit condition.
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Based on the foregoing argument, we can conclude that pi0 = pi1 = 0
holds for any pair (t, n0) on the dotted line in Figure 1, pi
0 = 0 at (1, N),
and pi1 = 0 at (0, 0), while pi0 (pi1) is positive (negative) at any pair above
the line and vice versa.
3.4 Nash Equilibrium Configurations
Based on the foregoing argument, we obtain the Nash equilibrium configu-
rations as follows: In order for a configuration to be a Nash equilibrium, it
must be impossible for a software firm to switch networks and increase its
profit.
In case A, the graph of t(n0) is drawn as curve A in Figure 1. So, there
are three equilibrium candidates; (n0 = n1 = N/2), (n0 = N, n1 = 0), and
(n0 = 0, n1 = N). Since
t(n0)

> n0/N if n0 < N/2,
< n0/N if n0 > N/2,
(17)
we can conclude that only symmetric equilibrium (n0 = n1 = N/2) is stable
in the sense of a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, in case C, the graph is drawn as curve C and
t(n0)

< n0/N if n0 < N/2,
> n0/N if n0 > N/2.
(18)
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Therefore, only two equilibria, (n0 = N, n1 = 0) and (n0 = 0, n1 = N), are
stable.8
Finally, in case B, the graph of t(n) is drawn as curve B and it is apparent
from the discussion above that all three of the equilibria, (n0 = n1 = N/2),
(n0 = N,n1 = 0), and (n0 = 0, n1 = N), are stable. So, we have the following
lemma:
Lemma: Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases
emerge:
Case A: If N1/(σ−1) ≤ kbσ/[(e− c)(σ − 1)], a unique symmetric equilibrium
exists, (n0 = n1 = N/2).
Case B: If kbσ/[(e − c)(σ − 1)] < N1/(σ−1) < 21/(σ−1)kbσ/2(e − c), three
equilibria, (n0 = n1 = N/2), (n0 = N, n1 = 0), and (n0 = 0, n1 = N), exist.
Case C: If N1/(σ−1) ≥ 21/(σ−1)kbσ/2(e−c), only two equilibria, (n0 = N, n1 =
0) and (n0 = 0, n1 = N), exist.
8 In the interval of n where t(n0) is greater than 1 (smaller than 0), the actual marginal
consumer, t, is equal to 1 (0) and is still above (below) the line t = n0/N .
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4 The Impact of Trade Liberalization
Now turn to the impact of trade liberalization. Trade liberalization implies
one basic change: the total number of consumers becomes 2. This implies
that the integrated market can support a larger number of software products:
the total number of complementary software products changes from N to 2N .
Since consumers prefer to consume a wide variety of software products, trade
liberalization might result in gains from product diversification. However,
we have to check the changes in the variety of hardware. Depending on
parameter values, several possible cases emerge. In order to highlight the
interaction between indirect network effects and trade liberalization, let us
examine the following two representative cases (these cases are summarized
in Figure 2).
4.1 The Case of Hardware Differentiation
First, let us assume that the following condition is satisfied:
(2N)1/(σ−1) ≤ kbσ/[(e− c)(σ − 1)]. (19)
Note that this condition holds when the degree of hardware differentiation
(k) is relatively large (or the degree to which indirect network effects exist
is relatively low). In this case, two types of hardware exist both before and
14
after trade liberalization. Thus, no consumer changes his or her hardware
and trade liberalization induces twice as many software varieties for each
type of hardware: n0 becomes 2n0 and n1 becomes 2n1. From (5), this
clearly increases every consumer’s utility.
Proposition 1: Given that condition (19) holds, both types of hardware
remain in the equilibrium and both countries gain from trade liberalization.
Note that these gains correspond to those obtained from the “love-of-variety”
approach to trade gains (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Through trade
liberalization, consumers in each country can obtain a wider variety of prod-
ucts, which results in mutual gains.
4.2 The Case of Hardware Standardization
Next, let us assume that the following condition is satisfied:9
kbσ/[2(e− c)] ≤ N1/(σ−1) ≤ kbσ/[(e− c)(σ − 1)]. (20)
In this case, while both types of hardware exist before trade liberalization,
only one type of hardware remains after liberalization. In other words, inten-
sified indirect network effects result in a reduced number of hardware varieties
9 Note that σ ≤ 3 is required for this condition.
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(2 rather than 1). For simplicity, let us suppose that only Hardware 1 re-
mains after trade liberalization. In this case, some consumers have to switch
from Hardware 0 to Hardware 1. While there are gains from the increased
diversity of software available, there are losses from switching to the other
network. The change in the indirect utility of a type-t consumer who switches
to the other network is:10
∆V (t) = [(41/(σ−1) − 1)(N/2)1/(σ−1)(e− c)(σ − 1)]/(bσ)− k(1− 2t). (21)
Note that the first term on the RHS represents the gains from software diver-
sification while the second term on the RHS represents costs from increased
disutility. Let us define a type-t˜ consumer who is indifferent to switching
hardware as follows:
t˜ = (1/2)− [(41/(σ−1) − 1)(N/2)1/(σ−1)(e− c)(σ − 1)]/2kbσ. (22)
Let us define the solution of 21/(σ−1) − 41/(σ−1) + 1 = 0 as σ˜. Then we can
show that t˜ > 0 holds when σ > σ˜:
t˜ ≥ (1/2)− (41/(σ−1) − 1)/21+1/(σ−1)
= (21/(σ−1) − 41/(σ−1) + 1)/2σ/(σ−1)

< 0 if 2 < σ < σ˜
> 0 if σ > σ˜
10 Note that, in the case of hardware standardization, the number of software varieties
for Hardware 1 increases from n1 to 4n1 (or from N/2 to 2N).
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Now we can state the possibility of losses from trade.
Proposition 2: If condition (20) and σ˜ ≤ σ ≤ 3 are satisfied and Hard-
ware 1 (resp. 0) dominates the integrated market, both countries’ consumers
who located at t ∈ [0, t˜] (resp. t ∈ [1 − t˜, 1]) are made worse off by trade
liberalization.
This implies that trade liberalization leads some consumers to “switch”
to an other-dominated brand, thereby increasing disutility. Note that this
finding is consistent with Farrell and Saloner’s (1986) results on excess stan-
dardization in their closed economy model. Note also that this case is highly
contrasted with the cases of universal gains from trade, which are emphasized
in the literature.11 We would like to emphasize that trade liberalization,
which forms a basis for a greater variety of software products (i.e., inten-
sified indirect network effects), may work as a catalyst for excess hardware
standardization.
11 See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985). Related to this, Chou and Shy
(1991) considered the case where the variety of non-traded domestic products is reduced
by trade liberalization.
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5 Conclusions
Indirect network effects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing
in the variety of complementary software products available for a hardware
device. In this study, we examine how trade liberalization affects production
structure in the presence of indirect network effects. For these purposes we
construct a simple, two-country model of trade with incompatible hardware
technologies. It is shown that, given that both hardware devices remain
after liberalization, every consumer gains from trade (Proposition 1). It is
also shown that, if the number of hardware varieties is reduced by trade
liberalization, some consumers may be made worse off by trade (Proposition
2).
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully it pro-
vides a useful paradigm for considering how indirect network effects (or hard-
ware/software systems) affect both the structure of production and the gains
or losses from trade.
References
[1] Chou, C., and Shy, O. (1990) ‘Network Effects without Network Ex-
ternalities,’ International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 8, pp.
18
259–270.
[2] Chou, C., and Shy, O. (1991) ‘Intra-industry Trade and Variety of Home
Products,’ Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, pp. 405–416.
[3] Chou, C., and Shy, O. (1996) ‘Do Consumers Gain or Lose when More
People Buy the Same Brand?’ European Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 12, pp. 309–330.
[4] Church, N., and Gandal, N. (1992) ‘Network Effects, Software Provision
and Standardization,’ Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 40, pp. 85–
104.
[5] Church, N., and Gandal, N. (1996) ‘Strategic Entry Deterrence: Com-
plementary Products as Installed Base,’ European Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 12, pp. 331–354.
[6] Desruelle, D., G. Gaudet and Y. Richelle (1996) ‘Complementarity, Coor-
dination and Compatibility: the Role of Fixed Costs in the Economics of
Systems,’ International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp.
747–768.
[7] Dixit, A. K., and J. Stiglitz (1977) ‘Monopolistic Competition and Opti-
mum Product Diversity,’ American Economic Review, Vol. 67, pp. 297–
308.
19
[8] Economides, N. (1996) ‘The Economics of Networks,’ International Jour-
nal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp. 673–699.
[9] Farrell, J., and G. Saloner (1986) ‘Standardization and Variety,’ Eco-
nomics Letters, Vol. 20, pp. 71–74.
[10] Gandal, N. (2002) ‘Compatibility, Standardization, and Network Effects:
Some Policy Implications,’ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 18,
pp. 80–91.
[11] Gandal, N., and O. Shy (2001) ‘Standardization Policy and International
Trade,’ Journal of International Economics, Vol. 53, pp. 363–383.
[12] Helpman, E., and P. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign
Trade, MIT Press.
[13] Kikuchi, T. (2007) ‘Network Externalities and Comparative Advantage,’
forthcoming in Bulletin of Economic Research.
[14] Shy, O. (2001) The Economics of Network Industries, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
20
N2
O
n0
N
t
1
2
1
A
B
C
Figure 1
21/(σ−1)kbσ
2(e−c)
(2N)1/(σ−1)
A
Differentiation
B C
Figure 2
kbσ
(e−c)(σ−1)
Standardization
(2N)1/(σ−1)N1/(σ−1)N1/(σ−1)
21
